as-slice was a warning, not an operation. The input type already decides
which of the two things happens — a Vec can only be borrowed, an array or a
string can only be viewed, and no call site picks between them — so the second
name expressed no choice a reader could make. And it warned at the moment the
view is taken, which is the one moment nothing is wrong; the danger arrives
later, at the push. slice now takes a Vec at all three arities and as-slice
is gone.
(slice v lo) was free, and is the arity the Vec never had: the runtime already
reads a hi of -1 as "to the end", so the tail form passes the caller's lo and
the same -1 — no slot, no length read, no second evaluation. The merge is
entirely in the checker; the Vec path builds the flan_vec_as_slice call it
always built and neither backend has a line about any of it.
A Vec a call returned is refused at every arity, and not for the array's
reason. (slice (mk)) over an array dangles. (slice (make-vec)) does not — the
storage outlives the expression — but the header is a temporary, so nothing
can ever free the block. The refusal says that and names the let.
The name's own refusal sits in ordinary_call after every table, so a program
that defines an as-slice still reaches its own. It reads for somebody who has
never heard of the old name and writes the call back out, spelling each
argument that is a name or a number.
The warning moved to where it bites: BUILT.md gains a section beside the Vec
table and the push row points at it, spec-memory.md's Borrowing says the same.
Investigated and deliberately not built — a diagnostic for a live view at the
push. (reserve v 100) then a slice, a push and a read is correct code under
the contract the spec chose, so any flag on it is a false positive by the
language's own semantics rather than by an approximation. FIX.org has the
finding and the syntactic sketch that does not work.
The INSERTIONSORT crash, all three rulings (FIX.org 2026-09-20):
- (bytes s) allocates a writable copy through the allocator surface —
context or (bytes s a), StorageExhausted with retry, a registry note in
dev builds (flan_bytes_dup, lowered like vec-new). (bytes-view s) is the
old zero-cost reinterpret, renamed, read-only by convention; every
in-repo reader swept over to it. (string b) unchanged.
- String constants were already read-only on both backends at -O0; now
pinned — bytes-copy.flan rows on LLVM/-O0/--x86, and dies_segv rows
asserting the write-through-view trap on both backends.
- A dev build installs a SIGSEGV/SIGBUS handler by the same dev-only
constructor slot that arms the registry: one line naming the address and
the innermost frame, then the trap-hook park — stopped, not dead, the
daemon serving. No agent: message and re-raise. Release builds untouched.
Pinned by trap_park over dev-segv.flan.
Constraints parsing peeled a body-leading map only when its first key was
literally :where; any other keyword fell through to the body, so a typo'd
key surfaced as a baffling error from inside what was meant as a predicate
and a stray map at body start compiled away silently. Any keyword-first map
is read as a constraint map now, but only when something follows it in the
body — a single-form map body is a real dyn value and not a discarded
statement, so that case is left alone.
An empty map literal still parses as a struct literal, (P {}) still meaning
the zero struct for a real struct name — the parser has no symbol table to
tell (take {}) apart from it at that point. check.ml now catches the case
where the name turns out to be a known function instead and says so, rather
than "unknown struct take".
flan_dyn.c's tag comment still said 6 and 7 were free; keywords and maps
took 4 and a kind field under BOX_OBJ, not new top-level tags, so 5, 6 and 7
are what is actually open for the interop handle. NEXT.md and json.flan both
still pointed at test/programs/arena-edn.flan, gone since edn/read stopped
taking an allocator; both now point at what replaced it.
flan_rt.c's flan_str_eq comment claimed the empty string literal was a
hypothetical null-pointer string; it isn't, its address is an interned
symbol's. The real case the zero-length guard exists for is a zero-length
container converted to a string. check.ml's ordering refusal said a string
has no comparison at all, which stopped being true when typed = and !=
grew strings in daed039 — split the message so an equality refusal and an
ordering refusal say the right noun, and updated the pinned rejects_check
rows to match. string-eq.flan gained the row the fast path most wants
tested, a slice against the prefix it was cut from sharing a base pointer at
different lengths, plus a != row at equal length with differing bytes;
acceptance now carries the real output, captured by running the program on
all three lanes. x86.ml's xor-1 comment now names the 0/1 return contract as
a requirement flan_str_eq must hold, not an incidental fact. SPIKE-DUPLICITY
now says plainly that its equality-and-ordering argument landed in daed039
and marks its transcript as the historical state that argument was made
against. FIX.org ticks M2 queue item 5.
And the acceptance runner: the tail check that turns a nonzero failure count
into exit 1 was already there and already fired — a fresh build with one row
broken already exited 1 before anything here changed. What wasn't proven is
that every path through the file's clang/wasmtime/raylib/lldb probes still
reaches that tail rather than skipping past rows that already failed. An
at_exit guard now closes that class regardless of which path the process
leaves by, flushing stdout first so a failing run's FAIL lines survive
Unix._exit rather than being dropped from the buffer. Verified both
directions with a deliberately broken row: dune test exits nonzero and the
log still carries the FAIL line and the failure count; restored, the same
run is exit 0 with nothing printed but green summaries. The other test
binaries were checked for the same gap and none have it — each gates its
own exit on a single failures ref that the tail already reads.
Types.is_equatable splits from is_comparable: a string answers equal?
now, bytewise, but still answers no to ordered? — there is no collation
the language has picked, so < and friends keep the refusal they had.
The comparison itself is one new runtime entry point, flan_str_eq
(runtime/flan_rt.c), length-mismatch and same-pointer fast paths ahead
of the memcmp, called identically from both backends: emit.ml pulls a
string's ptr and length out of the %slice SSA value and calls it
directly in the Eq/Ne arm; x86.ml adds an arm ahead of the generic
scalar comparison that reaches it through call_native, flipping the
answer for != the same way Not already flips a bool.
test_flan.ml covers the checker side directly and through a generic
instantiated at string, including the two different ways ordered? and
equal? fail at that type. test/programs/string-eq.flan is the survey
program — same pointer, differing lengths, equal content at distinct
addresses (a literal against a fresh heap string), a difference in the
last byte, and the empty-string cases — with acceptance rows for LLVM,
-O0 and --x86 in test_acceptance.ml.
